Dan Lloyd RV-10 "Factual" report out...

All I can say is...

Holy Cow!
I am stressing over a slightly sticky throttle, and wont fly my bird until I have that issue solved.
I too used a lot of "new to me" electronics in my aircraft, but I took the time to understand each piece individually. Then how those new electronics interacted with each other, and finally, how to use and interprate them. All this before the first flight. My initial workload was easy to handle. Then I fixed one bug at a time. Thats what phase 1 is all about. By the time I entered phase 2, I had confidence in my airplane and equipment. Then I was ready for some cross country travel, and passengers.
This tragic incident has a lot of lessons in it.
Maybe, as builders, we should take new technology in bites we can chew. We are all different. Some of us can "drink from a fire hose" with no problem. Others stare at an EFIS for hours trying to understand it.
All I'm saying is, build an aircraft you are sure you will fly proficiently.
Another thing I have learned from this, If anyone ever needs help understanding anything about building an airplane, or if I ever see yet another big mistake a builder is getting ready to make, I will make sure I point it out. In the past, I have held my tongue when I saw something really scary. Didn't want to offend anyone, so I would wait until I was asked.
No more.
My regards to this gentleman's family.

Chris

rv6ejguy said:

Please, please people, lower the nose if the prop ever stops at low altitude. Make sure it is instinctive though repeated training. Nothing else will matter in a few seconds if you fail to do this and stall.

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Getting off subject,

But it's one advantage of flying many years of radio control. You see all kinds of stalls ranging from the infamous return to the airport, to accelerated; such as pulling out of a loop to fast before hitting the ground. It get's etched in your mind, without doing it first hand.

L.Adamson --- RV6A (flying)

Reading this there are three things that particularly stand out as a newbie builder.

1. it's not a race. Don't rush to finish the build and don't cut corners. Make sure everything is installed correctly.
2. we may be experimental, but the FARs still apply (in the USA at least). 200+ HP => high performance signoff, wobbly prop => complex signoff. Make sure you know how all the equipment works (as you would need to to get signed off on any other aircraft)
3. phase 1 is not a chore to run off the allotted hours. Its a time to prove the aeroplane is safe (FAR 91.319). The allocated time is a minimum to prove that safety - phase 1 does not automatically end just because you've run up the hours.

rjt194 said:

wobbly prop => complex signoff.

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WRONG! I hear this all the time and it is flat out wrong. A c/s prop does not require a complex signoff.

FAR Part 61.31:

(e) Additional training required for operating complex airplanes. (1) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(2) of this section, no person may act as pilot in command of a complex airplane (an airplane that has a retractable landing gear, flaps, and a controllable pitch propeller; or, in the case of a seaplane, flaps and a controllable pitch propeller), unless the person has--


You only need the complex endorsement if the airplane has ALL three (controllable pitch prop, retractable gear AND flaps) unless it is a seaplane and in that case you need the endorsement if it has flaps and an adjustable pitch prop.

Time to vent.

Here's what I took from the report. There are 100 lessons to be learned but this guy was bound and determined to reach the scene of his own accident in the shortest possible time. It would not have mattered what anyone told him! He pushed his way through engine manufacturers, turbo manufacturers, avionics suppiers and EFIS suppliers, he did not do any study of the systems of his plane, and took every shortcut possible on every system! He made potentially fatal mistakes on:

control linkages
fuel system
ignition system
engine control system
prop control system
engine instrumentation
flight instrumentation
airframe
electrical system

etc etc etc, not to mention the total disregard for the FARs and operating limitations.

What are the odds that a fatal accident would NOT have occurred? Just about 0.

Anybody else who had made those decisions and lived through the first flight would have been so scared that he'd have gotten religion and became a safety fanatic until every nut, bolt, screw, rivet, pushrod, cable, wire, radio, etc was exactly right.

More amazing than his absolute lack of understanding what he was messing with was his willingness to put his wife and family and friends in the plane with him!

I feel very sorry for his family and everyone who loved him, but I don't think it would have mattered what anyone said. He was going to take whatever risk it took.

Wow!!!

I have read many NTSB reports, always trying to learn. This one is very difficult to understand how one can go so far off target.

My airplane is currently in Phase I testing. I have been so lucky to have the people I have met during the build look at it. I personally want to thank the following:

Paul Dye, Steve Behrends, Dennis McCright, Bud Warren, Dick Stevens, among many others. In particular, I want to thank Rich, he is doing the Phase I testing, and boy is he a stickler. After reading this report, I promise, I will never sigh again when he tells me something needs to be adjusted or calibrated.

It will be "Yes, sir!" Verbal, mind and spirit.

Yep, I'm pretty darn lucky.

rjt194 said:

2. we may be experimental, but the FARs still apply (in the USA at least). 200+ HP => high performance signoff

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Doesn't apply to EAB's unless it is in the Operating Limitations.

N941WR said:

Doesn't apply to EAB's unless it is in the Operating Limitations.

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It is supposed to be in the operating limitations.
"The PIC must meet the requirements of par 61.31(e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (j) as appropriate."
It should be in the paragraph following the aerobatic limitations.

RV-10 accident

One ?. How did the examiner ever sign this aircraft off as airworthy? Had he demanded appropriate fixes for the many deficiencies suggested in the FAA report the builder might have taken time to correct all or some them. As has been suggested this might not have done any real good in preventing a future accident. It's clear that the process leading up to the first flight failed in some way and that much of the responsibility for that failure rests with the builder/pilot. Should there be other safeguards against incompetence of the build process and pilot understanding of systems, avionics, etc? Thank God his family is safe. Bill

Bubblehead said:

Time to vent.

etc etc etc, not to mention the total disregard for the FARs and operating limitations.

What are the odds that a fatal accident would NOT have occurred? Just about 0.

Anybody else who had made those decisions and lived through the first flight would have been so scared that he'd have gotten religion and became a safety fanatic until every nut, bolt, screw, rivet, pushrod, cable, wire, radio, etc was exactly right.

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wouldn't all he have had to done is made a good glider landing in the field to have survived the accident? I don't see why all that would have to lead up to a FATAL accident.

I'm aware

RV6_flyer said:

Darwin:

That info is PUBLIC record and can be obtained by anyone who pays a fee to the FAA. DAR's can get his info but they pay for it. They do get a discount above what the general public pays.

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Hi Gary,

The question was more rhetorical and should have been more of statement of "how could this be signed off?" Fully aware of Public records requests.

I was also aware this airframe had been inspected by a FSDO and not signed off on that visit.

Still hard to believe the sequence of events that led to this.

Off airport landing

Danny7 said:

wouldn't all he have had to done is made a good glider landing in the field to have survived the accident? I don't see why all that would have to lead up to a FATAL accident.

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Yes, an off airport landing might have worked. I am not familiar with the area, but there may have been an option. The problem frequently centers on the pilot's mind set. Trying to "save the airplane" kills a lot of people. Trying to make it back to the airport, stretching glides, and the like is a terrible plan. Saving yourself is much better goal. It works, I know.

John Clark
RV8 N18U "Sunshine"
KSBA

I feel sorry for the family...

I am sure this report will find its way back to the family somehow. It's got to be tough. I know my family is placing a lot of confidence in me to build and fly safe. It's a lot of responsibility.

I only just started but I remember when this happened, as I was a lurker on the Matronics list. I remember the fund set up for his family, and the posts after the accident. This report pretty much confirms everyone's suspicions.

Hopefully good will come from this - someone will change their direction when they start down a dangerous path. We're building oversized aluminum boxes launching us over the clouds at 200+ MPH. It doesn't take much to convert them to hole diggers.

Let's all stay humble, build safe, and take advantage of all the expertise, experience and knowledge out there (this site definitely included).

I agree theoretically with Danny7's question about making an off-airport landing, but John Clark has it right. Mindset of the pilot. Look at all the trials and tribulations the builder had gone through including one (or was it two) flights from PA to FL to get the engine and turbo running properly. He ignored the risks and the chances every step of the way. He showed poor judgment at every turn. Why would he have chosen to put the odds of survival in his favor? He had not done that through the whole building and flying process.

I'd be interested to know what he was like as a student pilot and as a instrument student. I would bet these traits were evident there.

Danny7 said:

wouldn't all he have had to done is made a good glider landing in the field to have survived the accident? I don't see why all that would have to lead up to a FATAL accident.

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Danny,

Two things COULD have happened.

1) He MIGHT have been distracted by some "issues" he was having, was close to the ground, and flew full speed into the dirt.

2) IF (this is a big IF as I have no idea what happened, only second hand info from a friend who was at the airport that day AKA rumor.) the prop was uncontrollable, he may have had one big air brake up front and became a lawn dart.

I'm not saying either of those things happened, the final cause will be determined by the NTSB but they sure have a LOT of "contributing factors" for figure this one out. These are just two of many scenarios that could have caused such a fatal accident.

This brings up an interesting point, with the Cheltons, GPS, etc. can't the NTSB pull the data from those flight instruments to determine what happened. Assuming, of course, they survived the fire.

They pulled data off the 496. It's inclueded inside the report.

I'm not looking at the report at the second, so my numbers might be off a bit.

Departed the airport and performed a T&G (or maybe a short full stop).

Departed and maneuvered. Climbed to 2600 and entered a decending spiral. Shortly above ground with a ground speed of 73ish knots.

And that's pretty much the last of the reported data before impact.

IIRC, I think they said the prop indicated that it wasn't turning at the time of impact.

Phil


UPDATED: I just found the paragraph for you...

Information downloaded from the airplane's Global Positioning System (GPS)unit revealed that a tracklog for the accident flight had been recorded. Based on GPS groundspeed and altitude, the accident airplane took off from 4G1 at approximately 0812 edt. The airplane than manuevered in the area surrounding the airport. It landed at 4G1 at 0825 edt and departed again at 0827. It than climbed to an altitude of 2,400 feet GPS altitude, and reached a groundspeed of 152 knots before descending in a left hand spiral above Pennsylvania State Route 58. The final tracklog point was located just west of the roadway. The last recorded GPS groundspeed was 71 knots, the last reported heading was 118.7 degrees, and the last recorded GPS altitude was 1,366 feet.

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Examinations of the blade surfaces indicated that the blades were not in rotation at time of impact. The electric pitch control motor end bell and exterior nylon slide exhibited severe melting. The blade retention nuts were also found tightened approximately 1/4 inch tighter than the index marks scribed on the hub. This however, did not appear to affect the pitch rotation friction. Disassembly of the propeller hub revealed that the pitch motor gearbox was intact and immobile, (as designed) and held the last pitch angle selected when under no electrical load. Examination of the blade shank assemblies, bearings, and pitch slide assembly revealed no anomalies, and measurements of the propeller pitch setting corresponded to a high pitch (cruise) setting.

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Phil said:

IIRC, I think they said the prop indicated that it wasn't turning at the time of impact.

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I was actually confused by that statement Phil, since normally, they would say "the prop was not rotating". Because the subsequent sentences all seemed to apply to the blade rotations in the hub (pitch change), it seemed to me that the sentence meant that the pitch wasn't changing. But I will admit that I am completely unsure of what they intended to mean.

Paul

How did the examiner ever sign this aircraft off as airworthy? Had he demanded appropriate fixes for the many deficiencies suggested in the FAA report the builder might have taken time to correct all or some them. As has been suggested this might not have done any real good in preventing a future accident. It's clear that the process leading up to the first flight failed in some way and that much of the responsibility for that failure rests with the builder/pilot. Should there be other safeguards against incompetence of the build process and pilot understanding of systems, avionics, etc?

Click to expand...

I have not seen one of these engine/prop combinations up close but I suspect the mechanical deficiencies would not have been obvious during the DARs inspection. For the inspection the cowl was probably off so the cleco part would not be observable. It is not the DARs responsability to tug on every wire or check the torque on every nut or AN fitting. In all likelihood the plane probably looked like every other RV 10 build with that engine prop combo.

The DAR and the FSDO inspector had nothing to do with this accident. It will be interesting to see who the attornies blame and if a jury of our peers agree with them.

If you are the builder and the pilot of your aircraft you are solely responsible for the outcome.

That's a good observation, Paul...

When I think of prop and rotate, I think of prop and rotate.

Phil

The prop has been brought up many times in this accident. Clearly from the text, it was found to be operating properly minus the constant speed controller which was not installed. Blades were found in the cruise pitch setting (low drag) so that didn't bring the plane down like an elevator. In any case, you can still glide in full fine by sticking the nose down a bit more.

Most people here don't seem to understand how the prop was being used manually. It just has a fine/ coarse toggle switch. You establish the fine setting for takeoff during runup via the tach. In climb, you toggle a bit coarser to maintain your climb rpm. Cruise, ditto. For landing, you fine out the pitch at a given manifold pressure as you enter the pattern to be ready for a go around. You simply go fine for more rpm and coarse for less. Very, very simple.

Worst that could go wrong would be forgetting to fine out the pitch prior to entering the pattern and having to go around. Could be exciting, likewise on takeoff if the prop was not set fine.

Generally once the fine setting is established in the climb, no prop adjustments are required for pattern work, just like a fixed pitch prop.

The way I read the report, the prop was not an issue in this accident. The prop was stopped at impact.

Jamie said:

You only need the complex endorsement if the airplane has ALL three (controllable pitch prop, retractable gear AND flaps) unless it is a seaplane and in that case you need the endorsement if it has flaps and an adjustable pitch prop.

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Just because something is legal, doesn't mean it's sensible.

Let me rephrase what I originally said. If having wobbly prop (or high performance engine, or retractable undercarriage), it would be sensible to ensure that you have had the appropriate training and, where appropriate, sign-off from the instructor (even if not a full complex endorsement) so that you, your family, and the NTSB know that you knew what you were doing and not making it up as you went along, even when it might not be strictly legally required

Don't be quick at blaming the inspector

In defense of the inspector we must look at the sequence of events to see the root cause.

1. The A/C crashed short of the airport.
2. The report indicates power loss which prevented it from making the airport.
3. The engine accessories required to operate require constant electrical power.
4. Battery cables were found not to be properly connected to the terminals. (further supported by info on the builder not having the proper tool for crimping) resulting in no electrical power.
5. The battery was moved forward, thus requiring new cables, "AFTER" the flight worthy inspection. The inspector could not have found this issue because it did not exist at the time.
6. The battery had to be moved forward because the CG was found to be too far aft during flight testing.
7. The CG was not done prior to the inspection. A copy of another planes CG was used.

In the end a decision NOT to follow the regulations PRIOR to the inspection, i.e. doing a weight and balance, was the beginning of the chain of events that led to this tragedy. In total the report shows a total lack of respect for regulations in general. There seemed to be an attitude of "Oh they don't apply to ME". Every time we think of ignoring a reg remember why they are, which is to IMPROVE SAFETY. Most of the regulations were introduced due to past tragedies and if we ignore them and more accidents occur that should not have more draconian regs will follow (i.e. Vegas).

Another observation...

From what I read, it seems to me that the aircraft stalled pretty close to the ground, that would explain the angle of impact. I also noticed that the efis system was never properly calibrated, so I believe it's possible that the pilot did not have accurate airspeed information, and as any one of us would try to do, the pilot was trying to fly the aircraft as slow as possible before the forced landing. Again, this is just my observation.

One of the saddest parts of this whole thing is most of us in the RV-10 community on the Matronics list knew Dan and his posts generated a ton of head shaking. After seeing his airplane at OSH prior to the crash I was not surprised when I read about it, nor do I suspect others who were familiar with his project. It hit hard for me because afterwards you question if you could have intervened further. He was a robust guy who loved his family and the RV-10 very much. The path by all of us who communicated our concerns to him was worn deep taking that horse to water. Any assumptions who the passenger on the first flight? I can't help to think there was great pressure to get that airplane to OSH for display...

Speculative comments deleted----------

Trying to be non-speculative here

First I'd like to say I feel very sorry for his family's loss. Losing a loved one or a father like that is just a horrible horrible thing and my heart goes out to his family. That is very rough.

Secondly, I, like most readers of the report, was rendured speechless for a long while. The guy was just destin to turn that airplane into a smoking hole in the ground and it's fortunate that he didn't take anybody else with him. Oh, and by the way, shame on him for jeopardizing the safety of others, including his wife, by flying them in an aircraft full of issues.

There was a "speculative" comment that was dealt a swift blow earlier today. Now I don't want to speculate but I'd like to state the facts as we know them:

1-The guy over the years, through online posts, had made comments that had caused others in the RV community concern over the safety of his build. It sounds like right up until the night before the crash that people were reaching out and trying to get through to him.

Now, this might be speculative but to drum up this kind of concern among the RV community I would think that he was making obviously questionable comments and performing questionable practices throughout the build.

2-The guy was in a hurry to get to OSH. The question is, why was he in such a hurry to rush through his Phase I, if he ever actually completed it, and fly with uncalibrated instruments, and a marginally functional prop? Well, maybe it was that he just loved airplanes like we do and just wanted to go to the show of shows. Or, you can take a look at these photographs of his airplane at that very show:

http://www.airport-data.com/aircraft/N289DT.html

You can see clearly from the middle picture that Eggenfellner was advertising the same set up that Mr. Lloyd had in his aircraft. I'll leave it at that.

Now, if the fact that he maintained that he flew off 40 hours in a week didn't raise a flag with anybody close to him, certainly the fact that he didn't understand all the bells and whistles in that aircraft should have. Or, the fact that nothing was calibrated, right up to the DG, should have. Certainly the non-functional prop or the missing turbo should have.

I think we have established that these items WERE a concern to those who corresponded with him, talked with him on the phone, or read his posts. Now, if the vast majority of RVers that paruse the online lists had a concern with his practices, certainly somebody working, or flying along side of him should have seen the red flags too.

Even after flying back to Florida the second time and working on the plane for months, the instruments still weren't calibrated and Mr. Lloyd still didn't understand how to use them. I gather from the NTSB report that the majority of the time back in Florida the second time was spent dealing with engine issues, which of course IS a good thing to do. But, there were other issues that shouldn't have been ignored.

I guess what I'm trying to say here is that it seems that it was not only Dan Lloyd who wanted to get to OSH badly. I think somebody needed to take a deep breath somewhere along the line and call a big time out...someone who didn't have get-there or get-done itis like Dan. It's a shame that nobody was able to save Dan from himself.

Let's all remember that we owe it to our loved ones to take care of ourselves and do our best to ensure that we come home every night. We have a dangerous hobby and our loved ones expect us to use our heads. If some shortcut or careless decision ends in our demise, our family's pain and their unanswered questions will last for the rest of their lives.

Be safe, go slow, and take a deep breath every now and again and ask yourself "What the heck am I doing here?"

Rick S. said:

One of the saddest parts of this whole thing is most of us in the RV-10 community on the Matronics list knew Dan and his posts generated a ton of head shaking. After seeing his airplane at OSH prior to the crash I was not surprised when I read about it, nor do I suspect others who were familiar with his project. It hit hard for me because afterwards you question if you could have intervened further. He was a robust guy who loved his family and the RV-10 very much. The path by all of us who communicated our concerns to him was worn deep taking that horse to water. Any assumptions who the passenger on the first flight? I can't help to think there was great pressure to get that airplane to OSH for display...

Speculative comments deleted----------

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OK.....So I'll drop my speculation and change it to a darn good observation. Based on my observation the engine manufacter imposed a great deal of pressure to get Dan's airplane and his product to OSH...That was said in a roundabout but very easy to understand comment by Dan himself at a small BBQ the day before OSH opened it's doors..I understand the censorship, At times I hate it. So I'm sure this will last just a few minutes as well..He was a friend, hard headed at times, but nontheless a friend. Now only the NTSB will speak for him and they are talking in circles and around the subject as well.

Rick S. said:

OK.....So I'll drop my speculation and change it to a darn good observation. Based on my observation the engine manufacter imposed a great deal of pressure to get Dan's airplane and his product to OSH...That was said in a roundabout but very easy to understand comment by Dan himself at a small BBQ the day before OSH opened it's doors..I understand the censorship, At times I hate it. So I'm sure this will last just a few minutes as well..He was a friend, hard headed at times, but nontheless a friend. Now only the NTSB will speak for him and they are talking in circles and around the subject as well.

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Actually, it was the other way around. Dan was continually bugging Jan for the turbo engine which was not ready at the time even to the point of insisting "it must be here" next week to install. The fact was the engine simply was not ready nor would it be in time. That is why an atmo engine was fitted for the show. Dan was always making impossible timetable demands on vendors for parts and services. In a mad rush for everything. Jan felt under pressure from Dan always on this aspect and was stressed about it. Not trying to defend Jan here, just set the record straight. Of course it would be good for the airplane to be at Osh. Jan was trying to sell engine packages but it was Dan pushing Jan to make it that year, not the other way around.

Sad that it had to end this way. Dan loved his -10 and the idea of the turbo Subaru engine.

Forget scapegoats.

Dan Lloyd wanted an RV-10, but he blew off the necessary investments in education, physical skills, craftsmanship, and patience. It cost him his life.

That's the lesson.

There are probably 1000 builders right here, right now, laboring under the impression that all they need to do is follow the vendor instructions to successfully assemble a kit airplane. Oh yes, the ease of kit construction and the many vendor products are wonderful.......but dumbing down the process is the other edge of the kitplane knife.

This is not a race to finish and fly. It is an opportunity to develop yourself in a great many ways. It is also very serious business. If you're not willing to pay the price, maybe this isn't the hobby for you. The RV community already has way too many POS airplanes built by nice guys.

Assistance Neither Asked for Nor Accepted

How many times during the building process do we hear of someone else doing things a bit - or a lot - differently, evaluate that process but ultimately discard it as not appropriate for our project? Usually end up with an "Even though it's not for me and I don't like it, he probably knows a lot more about it than I do and has decided it's ok" conclusion, which reenforces our natural tendancy to avoid confrontation.

I didn't know Dan - and away from the homebuilt process he may have been the most brilliant guy in the world - but his decision mindset and processes regarding his RV-10 were just plain stupid.

You can't fix stupid.

Can anyone think of - based on the fragmented information you had regarding various systems in Dan's plane - any kind of intervention that would have changed his building philosophy? I think the only thing that may have would have been an event that scared the s**t out of him - but unfortunately, that type of event normaly runs the ragged edge between life and death.

Dan's legacy is now an appreciation from the rest of us of very painful lessons learned.

Wow, one scary report.
I remember hearing about Dan doing his phase 1 in 1 week. And, he was using an auto-conversion Egg setup with CS prop.

My thoughts were, "there is no way he could have completed the phase 1 in 1 week".

We are given 40 hours for a reason. I needed all of that and was very meticulous in my testing to make sure I was not putting myself or my family in harms way.

We should all learn from this.

Holy I can't believe my eyes Batman

Well after finally reading the report I understand the other active safety threads that are going on a little more clearly. While reading the report my jaw was gaping open and if the result hadn't been somebodies life it would have read like a comedy. Before reading any bodies replies my mind locked on the engine manufacturer. Aren't the EGG FWF packages basically ready to be bolted to the firewall, then after power and fuel connections are hooked up isn't the thing ready to start? I know that is simplistic, but back when I didn't consider one of those that was more or less the impression I was getting from the adds. I think something has to be drastically wrong with the FAA's write up. Simply put I cannot believe Jan saw any of what we read about under the hood of this airplane and didn't correct or demand it corrected. To believe he knowingly flew in it without electrical power connected, or having ever been connected is something I struggle with. His engine packages are beautiful and his attention to detail conflicts with the investigations findings. Then to believe that the engine manufacturer used this airplane as a sales platform at OSH with the cowl off where there are literally thousands of people a day looking at it with everything completely Mickey Moused seems outragious and frankly I don't believe it. I'm more inclined to believe things were prettied up for Jan and re-moused later. Does anybody out there have pictures that they took of this plane at OSH that they can post? Somewhere out there somebody had to have taken shots of it. I'm betting everything was connected at that time.

Edit... After going back and reading more responses, Ross F. alludes to this being a temperary engine that was used at Osh. Is that what happened? Did a different engine get added later on? This is hard to follow.

Bryan Wood said:

I'm more inclined to believe things were prettied up for Jan and re-moused later. Does anybody out there have pictures that they took of this plane at OSH that they can post? Somewhere out there somebody had to have taken shots of it. I'm betting everything was connected at that time.

Edit... After going back and reading more responses, Ross F. alludes to this being a temperary engine that was used at Osh. Is that what happened? Did a different engine get added later on? This is hard to follow.

Click to expand...

The report is clear to me, it was the same engine, just with turbo finally added. According to the report the 'mousing' happened just a day before accident when Dan finally did real weight and balance, found out that his CG is way in the back and moved battery without properly redoing all connections.

That's how I read it.

Bryan Wood said:

Aren't the EGG FWF packages basically ready to be bolted to the firewall, then after power and fuel connections are hooked up isn't the thing ready to start? ISimply put I cannot believe Jan saw any of what we read about under the hood of this airplane and didn't correct or demand it corrected. To believe he knowingly flew in it without electrical power connected, or having ever been connected is something I struggle with. His engine packages are beautiful and his attention to detail conflicts with the investigations findings. Then to believe that the engine manufacturer used this airplane as a sales platform at OSH with the cowl off where there are literally thousands of people a day looking at it with everything completely Mickey Moused seems outragious and frankly I don't believe it. I'm more inclined to believe things were prettied up for Jan and re-moused later. Does anybody out there have pictures that they took of this plane at OSH that they can post? Somewhere out there somebody had to have taken shots of it. I'm betting everything was connected at that time.

Click to expand...

Your conclusions aren't accurate. Jan was in 4G1 and did the majority of the work on the engine install while I was observing one day. I was just starting my RV-10 build and was very curious since Dan had the first one. A friend and I flew over for the day.

All I will say is after this day and after some conversations with both Dan and Jan at OSH that year, I decided that I would not be installing one of Jan's engines in my aircraft.

Dan did move his battery later. There was only one engine installed in Dan's aircraft.

Very Sobering

How did this man get that far without someone stepping in?
IF anyone witnesses me going in this direction on my project you have my permission to grab me by the collar and slap me silly.
Wow, I still can't believe that report!

Engine supplier..

I have to ask how the engine supplier got through that report without some serious issues. Yes, i fully agree that the builder of the aircraft is the last word and absolutely responsible but...to fly cross country with the engine builder, remove a blade from the prop, disable safety sensors...just amazing. I believe Dan is resposible, but the engine supplier sure seems to be a contributior to this not the voice of reason, or a big helper or a technical assistant...merely a product pusher assisting in getting it to market (osh) no matter the cost. He had to know the hours, the issues, the risks...he has been around long enough that he could not have turned a blind eye by accident. What a truly awful report to be public. Sure puts the scare back in "experimental" when we all are trying so hard to make the best, safest aircraft we can for our family, ourselves and our insurance. What a shame.

Dan was the reason for the crash. The engine does not run without power. Dan moved the battery up front and did not properly fasten/install it. The cables were not properly crimped. The Sube would have been running if it had juice.

TSwezey said:

Dan was the reason for the crash. The engine does not run without power. Dan moved the battery up front and did not properly fasten/install it. The cables were not properly crimped. The Sube would have been running if it had juice.

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Thanks Todd.

rv6ejguy said:

Actually, it was the other way around. Dan was continually bugging Jan for the turbo engine which was not ready at the time even to the point of insisting "it must be here" next week to install. The fact was the engine simply was not ready nor would it be in time. That is why an atmo engine was fitted for the show. Dan was always making impossible timetable demands on vendors for parts and services. In a mad rush for everything. Jan felt under pressure from Dan always on this aspect and was stressed about it. Not trying to defend Jan here, just set the record straight. Of course it would be good for the airplane to be at Osh. Jan was trying to sell engine packages but it was Dan pushing Jan to make it that year, not the other way around.

Sad that it had to end this way. Dan loved his -10 and the idea of the turbo Subaru engine.

Click to expand...

If I may add to what Ross says, I met Dan Lloyd ever so briefly at OSH 07 just long enough to say hello in front of his airplane. It was parked with the EGG display which was located behind Vans tent in the aircraft display area.

I was impressed that the airplane had been flown in. It was a long way from being completed - you see more completed machines on display that were trucked in. But that's neither here nor there, lots of airplanes are flown before they are finished. All you need is the paper work.

I spoke more with Jan than Dan Lloyd. They were making good progress to fix the cooling issue. The Lloyd H6 had the larger radiators and they had just completed a new cowl before the flight. Jan had it stashed away behind the tent because it looked like a sows ear, but the design made sense in that it did provide for max air flow directly through the new large rads. It was the prototype of what the EGG factory provides today. In typical designer fashion, Jan showed me a napkin drawing that was used to build it. It was most interesting to me because my H6 cooling issues were unresolved. I had flown in but not without the usual special techniques to control temperatures.

Although it was just a cursory look, I did not see anything about the RV-10 that would render it not fit to fly. But it did not meet the usual display appearance of airplanes in that area of the show. I know it irritated the guys at the Vans booth just next door because I spoke with one of them whom I have known for some time.

I do not know who was the driving force to get the airplane to OSH in that condition, but clearly its appearance was not good for EGG sales and probably did not impress anyone wandering in from the Vans display either. But Dan Lloyd, sitting in a high chair, appeared to be pleased to be there. And rightfully so, it was no small feat pulling it off.

It appears at this time that if Dan Lloyd had crimped those battery cables properly, he would still be working on resolving some of the less critical items. But who knows what else might have popped up and bitten him in the butt. Thank goodness, his wife and kids are alive. There was an earlier tragedy with a Velocity and a prop failure that took out an entire family of 4, we don't need any more of those.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20001208X09130&key=1

Let's stay on topic, please

Six posts were deleted because they were taking this important thread off into unrelated areas about ignition systems that weren't on the Lloyd aircraft.

Tomasz said:

The report is clear to me, it was the same engine, just with turbo finally added. According to the report the 'mousing' happened just a day before accident when Dan finally did real weight and balance, found out that his CG is way in the back and moved battery without properly redoing all connections.

That's how I read it.

Click to expand...

Got it. I went back and re-read Ross's post. He had written, "That is why an atmo engine was fitted for the show." I mistook that statement as Mr. Loyd having a different engine for Osh than what he would ultimately be delivered from Egg. My mistake.

Don't you dare.
Rant on.

Thank God he was alone

I'm very sorry he got killed, but I'm so glad he was alone and didn't kill anyone on the ground.

From the sound of that report, the only thing in doubt was which flight he would get killed on.

The list of problems is long and horrifying, but a few summery points stood out to me:

1-In a hurry, in a hurry, in a hurry, in a hurry....................................
2-Low time pilot acting as test pilot of a truly experimental airplane.
3-Builder who seems to lack a basic understanding of his airplane

I think #2 & #3 are very troubling, but probably would not have killed him if it were not for #1.

There has been some commenting to the effect that others should have intervened. My opinion:
After 911, none of us is going to let a couple of crazies with box cutters get control of a commercial airplane. Hindsight is 20-20. I think there may be lessons to be learned about exactly and when you should aggressively put your nose into someone else's business. However, the flip side is that if you push someone too hard with good advice, they may shut you out and you loose all ability to influence them. Anyway, this aspect is something to think about, but I would not blame others for what this guy did.

It seemed to me that this was someone who should not have been building an airplane because he didn't understand how they work, and he didn't have the patience to proceed methodically and learn. He also did not have the piloting skill or temperament to be test pilot of that airplane.

This was 100% his responsibility.

"A man has got to know his limitations". Pilots who don't are going to get killed eventually.

For me, reading this reinforces what I already knew about myself: I tend to be in a hurry all the time. I already deliberately force myself to slow down when flying and maintaining my airplane and I need to keep doing that if I want to live. This is the same reason that it is not clear to me that I have the temperament to build an airplane myself. If I can maintain mine over a period of years without doing something incredibly stupid, then I might attempt it.

Darwin Award

This guy deserves a Darwin Award. It seems he had a total common sense bypass.

I have every sympathy for this guy's family for their loss. However I have no sympathy for the pilot. Because of this guy's stupidity, there is now a family without a husband or a father. Thank goodness there was no one else hurt.

It is actions like this that give the Experimental community a bad press and lead to rules and restrictions that everyone then has to comply with.

When I was learning to fly, my instructor gave me a stack of NTSB reports to read. The following phrases still come to mind 30 years later:

Failure to obtain/maintain airspeed...
Inadequate pre-flight preparations...
Continued VFR into IFR conditions...

Perhaps concerned DARs and EAA tech counselors should compile a list of reports similar to this RV10 disaster, and leave copies with ALL builders they encounter. Maybe Doug would like to collect a few and make them available for downloading.

The only way for me to make sense of this tragedy is if this one life can save many others.

Steve Brown said:

For me, reading this reinforces what I already knew about myself: I tend to be in a hurry all the time. I already deliberately force myself to slow down when flying and maintaining my airplane and I need to keep doing that if I want to live. This is the same reason that it is not clear to me that I have the temperament to build an airplane myself. If I can maintain mine over a period of years without doing something incredibly stupid, then I might attempt it.

Click to expand...

"the temperament to build an airplane"

knowing several factory workers, working at a kitplane factory assistance shop, and hearing stories from cessna factories, i think anyone with a high school degree can build the airframe of a plane.

Now if someone wants to hone in on some specifics and say you need a continuing education to be a pilot and the mechanic for a finished home built, sounds good.

I wonder how many airplanes were built in factories by many people with no more education than a high school diploma. schucks, i'll bet all that is really required for 90% of the manual tasks is passing grades in shop class or a willingness to learn what is acceptable construction and to build to that standard, no matter how many times it takes to re-do.

After reading Kahuna's rant, I have a few observations:

In the end, yes, the cause of the crash appears to be a result of a poor cable crimp and speculatively a failure to maintain flight speed. None of the other factors mentioned appear to have had a direct result on the crash. However there are many things we can learn here I think outside direct causes.

These reports are to educate others to possibly prevent someone from making the same mistakes again. In that it goes into unusual detail simply points to the unusual chain of events and the fact that some of the story leading up to the event was documented in E-mails. These details do have bearing on how some people think, justify and ultimately act. I think we can all learn from that too.

Kahuna is right that we all accept risks in life and flying and I agree that is our choice however when it impacts others we should give careful thought as to what we are doing. It is doubly tragic when some fool takes another life or lives with him in a senseless accident because he does not realize the potential risk he is putting others in. Not only are family lives shattered but sometimes even more regulation is brought down on the rest of the surviving aviation community. In this case, only Dan paid the ultimate price for his mistakes but it is a chilling thought that had this test flight been successful, his whole family would have been put at risk on the very next flight.

In that dead pilots are often taken to task by their peers after reading an accident report, that's the way it is and that is not likely to change any time soon. Once you are dead, that won't concern you too much. Should this bother anyone a lot, my suggestion is to evaluate your choices and decisions on the ground and in the air and make smart ones as much as you can. Maybe we won't have to read about you.

Sorry to say but many accidents are the result of purely stupid decisions and this is not just with the benefit of hindsight- some reasonable thought on the subject would have revealed these decisions as imprudent at the time with the facts available at the time. It is the simple truth that repeated "high risk" activities do indeed put you at higher risk of eventual injury.

When faced with a situation, we can only do our best under the circumstances. Putting yourself in the seat with the facts available at the time to a pilot and realistically evaluating how you would have reacted is often enlightening. Often you might say, I would have done the same things. We do learn something that way.

It is unfathomable however to see time and time again yet another stall accident after power loss. (not saying that is what happened in this case for certain) I really believe training and paying attention to flying basics like airspeed can prevent most of these accidents from being fatal. I've often thought that we should have a big yellow arrow sticker on the ASI for best glide speed so we don't have to think about that while we sort out the rest of getting down safely. Train to look at the ASI every 5 seconds in engine out training or any time you are below 500 feet for that matter with the engine running.

Dan Lloyd's accident is high profile and has garnered lots of attention and discussion. Perhaps a few people will remember some of the lessons here and how they might apply to their building and flying. I sure hope to.

I wouldn't shoot the messenger here. They have simply presented facts, not drawn any conclusions so far. It is a free world for people reading the facts to interpret them as they want and to express those feelings. Fair? Perhaps not but I think the discussion is useful nevertheless.

Don't you dare

Kahuna:
Every accident/incident is a learning opportunity. Hopefully, the end result is that it will prevent someone else from heading down the same road. Unfortunately, it's pretty clear that the lessons are often times lost. Reading this accident report is like a primer on aeronautical decision making.
The Rules are for Someone Else - Test flights, work standards, documentation - not for me.
I'm helpless - Don't understand my own flight systems. I'll just ignore them rather than calibrate and learn them. If things go really wrong, I give up.
Invinceable - I'll just fly by the seat of my pants, who needs input.

As to the cause of the accident, are you suggesting that everyone accept the issue was a lost electrical connection and let it go at that? The FAA report suggests a chain of nearly unbelievable events. Each one certainly a learning opportunity for both pilots and builders. This report should be required reading at every EAA chapter meeting in the coming weeks.

You speak about your "freedom", and I agree that we live in a great country where much of what we do we consider as our "rights". Unfortunately, all too often, poorly exercising those rights has an impact on others. Had this "test" flight been successful and the connection let go the following day, the point would perhaps be clearer.

I close by offering that sometime during nearly every flight lesson, I'm able to offer an example of poor decision making or airmanship that's happened in the past 38 years. It's usually presented in the form of "One time, this friend of mine..." Of course, the student always knows who "this friend" is. Hopefully, some of it will sink in deeply.

Terry, CFI
RV9A N323TP

This thread is going on and on, but that is ok. What I think is something is the situation around this happening. Here is a guy that has broken pretty much all the rules, rules of the FAA as well as common sense. What motivates a person to bypass everything to put blinders on and do what is the wrong thing, just to make it so a totally experimental engine can, "make it". With total disregard to safety and not only that, this is a fresh pilot to boot. Just doesn't make sense.

What I hope WON'T happen from all this is new standards brought out to limit what we as responsible builders and flyers' can do in the future. This, I hope, is an isolated cercumstance that will just fade away but NOT be forgotten.

Be careful out there, there is nothing like the proven. Enjoy the hobbie.

Perhaps something that has not been touched on so much here is the electrical system layout on engines equipped with electrically dependent EIs and/or EFI. Careful thought should be given to design and operation of the primary and backup systems. I can suggest a few points to ponder:

1. Backup systems probably should not rely on the primary contactor, battery or wiring to the main bus

2. Automatic switching of backups needs to be carefully constructed and designed

3. Consider redundant ground wires for critical systems as well. A broken ground path is just as critical as power paths.

I am wondering how many Lycoming installations equipped with twin electrically dependent EIs have backup electrical systems fitted?

It might be a good time to review your system design and emergency procedures.

rv6ejguy said:

Perhaps something that has not been touched on so much here is the electrical system layout on engines equipped with electrically dependent EIs and/or EFI. Careful thought should be given to design and operation of the primary and backup systems. I can suggest a few points to ponder:

1. Backup systems probably should not rely on the primary contactor, battery or wiring to the main bus

2. Automatic switching of backups needs to be carefully constructed and designed

3. Consider redundant ground wires for critical systems as well. A broken ground path is just as critical as power paths.

I am wondering how many Lycoming installations equipped with twin electrically dependent EIs have backup electrical systems fitted?

It might be a good time to review your system design and emergency procedures.

Click to expand...

I'll add a few more:

4. If safety depends on backup systems, the response to failure of the primary system should be demonstrated. This testing should be done on the ground, if possible. I've participated in more than one test, on aircraft from multiple manufacturers, where the response to failure of a major primary system was different from what had been predicted. Some of these bad responses would probably have resulted in an accident had they occurred in service.

5. If safety depends on backup systems, the serviceability of those backup systems should be checked at some reasonable interval.

6. Emergency procedures should not only be reviewed, they should be practiced. Too many people are killed because the pilot mishandles an engine failure.

7. System failure procedures should not only be reviewed, they should be practiced. I'm aware of multiple fatal accidents where the accident was caused by poor pilot response to a switchover to a backup system.